How can so few Labour votes result in so many Labour seats in Parliament? It’s a phenomenon that has many questioning the validity of our FPTP voting system. Many thanks to guest writer, Darren Andrews, for this article addressing the possibilities for election reform.
~ LibertariDan

The disproportional relationship between the national share of votes and the number of seats won in the House of Commons has again come to the fore in the wake of the 2024 UK General Election, leading to calls for the First Past the Post (FPTP) voting system to be replaced by a form of Proportional Representation (PR).

FPTP is a plurality voting system. That is to say, the winner is decided by who gets the most votes, regardless of whether or not a majority of votes is achieved. In the UK, the General Election is a series of local (constituency) elections that return one Member of Parliament (MP) per constituency to the House of Commons. The party with the majority of seats forms the next government.

PR aims to have the number of seats in the House of Commons closely mirror the share of the vote. So if a party gets 10% of the share of the vote it should get approximately 65 of the 650 seats in the Commons. There are various forms of PR, but we will contain ourselves herein to the general idea. I would point the reader to the Additional Resources at the end of this article for more information on the topic.

Below, I compare what I believe to be the important pros and cons of First Past the Post and Proportional Representation, and conclude with some thoughts on whether or not any change should be made to our current system.

FPTP and PR Compared

Majority Winner

FPTP: Candidates are often elected without securing a majority of the votes. Thus MPs often do not have the broad support of their constituents. For example, in the July 4th UK General Election only around 90 seats out of 650 were won with a majority of the share of the vote.[i]

PR: Candidates are often elected with a minority of the share of the vote in a constituency, even less than under FPTP. Candidates who win an actual majority in a constituency may not even win the seat under PR. If Party A wins 60% of the share of the vote in every constituency under PR some of those winners must be robbed of their victory (despite having the broad majority support of their constituency) because of the need to allocate seats to the parties that won the other 40% of the vote. Common ‘solutions’ to this all run afoul of other issues covered herein, chiefly the breaking of the candidate-constituency connection and the quality of simplicity (see later).

Tactical Voting

FPTP: Voters can feel their vote is ‘wasted’ if they vote for a preferred candidate who has little chance of winning, so they may ‘tactically vote’ for a candidate who is likely to beat the candidate they dislike the most.

PR: Tactical voting occurs under PR as well. Examples include: a voter opting to vote for a party that has a better chance of forming a coalition rather than their preferred party; in list systems with thresholds, voters may consider their vote ‘wasted’ if they vote for a party that is unlikely to achieve the threshold percentage of the total vote; parties may instruct voters how to tactically cast their lower preferences in ranking systems to undermine major opposition or boost smaller supportive parties; in the AMS or Additional Member System (a mix of FPTP and PR), a voters’ constituency and list votes may differ according to tactical considerations — the ACT Party in New Zealand focuses all its attention on one seat in the Auckland suburbs which, due to the rules, can give it more seat than another part than wins more votes across the country.

Connection to Candidate

FPTP: The voter is primarily voting for a candidate, not a party. A voter may even vote for a candidate they know and like regardless of their party, or one not affiliated with a party at all; there is thus a strong local link between the elected and the electorate. The candidate is known to the local people or at least to his peers within that constituency. The candidate has a connection to their constituency. They have local knowledge and can bring up local issues and represent their constituency’s concerns in the Commons.

PR: The voter is primarily voting for a party, not a candidate. The voter might not even know who the candidate is under some forms of PR; there is thus no link between the elected and the electorate. This produces a more fragmented, inward-looking form of politics whereby parties need no longer seek broad-based electoral local support in order to achieve power – it is nation-focused to the detriment of the constituency. The House of Commons would become one of parties rather than candidates of the people of each constituency. A relationship between the party and MP is fostered at the expense of a relationship between the MP and people of the constituency.

Ease of Removal of Unpopular Government

FPTP: Governments are easier to kick out of power if they become unpopular as it is usually clear who is responsible and thus accountable due to the lack of coalitions. Although FPTP tends to entrench two parties, British history shows that these parties can be dislodged and even disappear, making way for new parties that better represent the broad interests of the people.

PR: Governments are harder to kick out of power if they become unpopular, not only because coalitions make it hard to know who is responsible (and thus accountable) but also because substantial swings are harder to bring about: the next government may well consist of some or even many of the same parties that were in the previous government that was just ‘kicked out’. Under PR a centrist party and its allies tends to dominate more permanently, sustaining what amounts to a one-dominant-party state. This is because the centre can form more coalitions than the Left or Right, due the Left and Right’s unwillingness to form coalitions with each other. It can thus be easier for controlling influences to coalesce under PR than under FPTP because they would only need to control the main centrist party. Small centrist “kingmaker” parties may always be in power as they are consistently needed to form a governing coalition. FPTP keeps the door open to real change (think Thatcher or Corbyn) whereas PR shuts the door permanently.

Simplicity

FPTP: A simple ballot paper means there is less opportunity and ability for fraudulent interference both before and during the count; ballots can easily be counted manually so there is no chance of electronic fraud. A simple ballot paper, and thus a simple counting process, means voters and counters are unlikely to get confused. Official observers can spot problems more easily. Everyone can understand why someone was elected. Everything is transparent. Simple ballots also lessen the number of spoiled ballots compared to other systems.

PR: Just about all voting systems except for FPTP are complex, thus creating problems in all the areas listed above. This is a huge disadvantage. Although keeping the ballot paper the same as under FPTP (though PR systems tend to have more complex ballots) would discount the voting, counting, and spoiled ballots problems, the allocation of seats would be confusing for many voters who might not get the candidate they actually voted for in their own constituency. Note that PR systems tend to multiply the number of parties standing, so the ballot paper would also be far longer. In reality a PR system would not employ a simple ballot paper.

Vote Splitting

FPTP: Vote splitting occurs in some way under all voting systems. It could be argued that parties under the FPTP system are encouraged to appeal to a broad base of the electorate to avoid such splitting of votes, thus discouraging single-issue and unpopular parties.

PR: Although vote splitting still occurs, the consequences of it are less severe for small parties so there is less incentive for parties to form broad-based support. Is that a good thing? Probably not. Parties need to take account of all the people and issues when forming part of a government, not just their own narrow interests (no matter how noble they may be).

Manifesto Pledges

FPTP: Parties can make pre-election promises and be held to account for them. The government is thus less able to break its promises to the people without consequences.

PR: Reduces the ability of parties to fulfil campaign pledges because they must seriously compromise with other parties (likely several) to form a government. PR encourages a more transactional form of politics based on post-election horse-trading between parties rather than pre-election promises between parties and the electorate – this again breaks the connection between the elected and the electorate.

Proportionality

FPTP: Proportionality of seats to share of the vote is not the goal of this system.

PR: Gives a disproportionate weight to small parties in the dynamics of the government, thus working against the very principle of fair representation PR claims to provide. PR disproportionately empowers voters of small parties at the expense of the majority of voters who tend to vote for one of the main parties, thus not providing everyone with an equal vote. A large number of parties makes it difficult for any party to govern. Parties under PR can secure seats by appealing to a small percentage of the population, thus incentivizing specialisation and a focus on a small part of the electorate instead of the people as a whole in a constituency or the country.

Speed of Succession

FPTP: The next government is clear in most cases, and when it is not a relatively fast coalition is formed

PR: Governments can take some time to form due to the need for multiple coalitions. Sometimes they fail to form at all.

Strength of Opposition

FPTP: Majority government gives for relative stability under FPTP. The system tends to return a clear majority of MPs from a single party, who form the government. The system also tends to return a large number of MPs for the second party, thus is more likely to create a strong viable opposition as an alternative, challenge, and political threat to the government.

PR: Hung Parliaments are a matter of course. Opposition is splintered and ineffective, with often no major single party in opposition holding it to account.

Broad-based Parties

FPTP: Favours broad-based parties, which ensures parties represent a wide range of views within their given portion of the political spectrum, and dissuades single-issue and unpopular parties from breaking through. In some sense the ‘coalitions’ under FPTP occur before the election by virtue of ‘broad church’ parties If parties become so broad a church that, as it is said, they no longer have a common religion (and maybe the roof also has a gaping hole) then such parties under FPTP become vulnerable to being replaced by other parties because the electorate will always want a genuine alternative that stands for something in opposition to the other side of the political spectrum represented by the other major party.

PR: Can incentivize single-issue or very unpopular parties, who do not represent the broad base of the population but rather some activist minority or special interests. Because coalitions tend to take place after the election, the vast majority of voters who supported the winning party may well see the reasons why they voted for that party being traded away and even unpopular policies being adopted that they never would have voted for. So rather than a broad-based party appealing to a broad base, it is raft of policies that end up appealing to no broad base at all.

Broad Local Support

FPTP: Requires a high concentration of votes in certain constituencies or a high number of votes overall in order to win a decent number of seats – thus parties have to genuinely build trust among voters over time by the party campaigning and persuading others to its cause. Small parties have to work hard to break through. This could be seen as a good thing because parties with genuinely bad ideas (or at least ideas that are deeply unpopular with any given electorate) are kept out of the Commons. After all, it is the people who should determine, rightly or wrongly, what is unpopular.

PR: Disincentivizes building local connections as it sees the nation as a whole – where its votes come from do not matter, as only the total vote share is relevant. Activist parties may get in and provide little representation for their constituency beyond the single-issue or unpopular views they may espouse.

Conclusion

No voting system is perfect. How we weight the pros and cons of each will depend on what we are trying to accomplish with that voting system.

For supporters of PR, proportionality, where the number of seats won reflects the share of the vote gained with a view to mirroring the values and opinions of the populace in the number of MPs, is rated very highly. Is that justified? Does it work as intended? Does that proportionality ultimately make things ‘fairer’ and more representative or less ‘fair’ and representative? Are there other important considerations to take into account other than some attempt to have a high degree of proportionality? I would point the reader to Appendix B below where I have included A.V. Dicey’s thoughtful comments on this matter.

It is also worth noting that there are some things that cannot ultimately be controlled in a voting system, such as how informed a voter is, whether or not a voter votes tactically or, indeed, if they vote at all.

It is my belief that the most critical features of a voting system are (1) that the voter is voting for a local person of known character, (2) that the winner has broad support from their constituency in the form of a majority of the share of the local vote, (3) that the voting system is simple so that it is plainly understood, easily counted, and not susceptible to fraud, and (4) that governments may easily be removed through the ballot box.

For this, and other reasons mentioned throughout, I would submit that PR is a bad system and that FPTP, despite its flaws, is its superior where it really matters.

Appendix A — A Cautious Proposal

I suggest that a realistic and cautious proposal to improve the current system would be to hold a run-off vote between the two leading candidates in each constituency where the primary vote returned no majority winner.

This provides solutions or partial solutions to some of the issues with FPTP:

— It ensures each MP has a majority of the vote in their constituency.

— It closes the gap somewhat between the share of the vote and the number of seats won than would otherwise have been the case, creating greater voter satisfaction for those who value proportionality.

— It encourages greater turn out in the primary vote because second place now has significance.

— It heightens the likelihood of voters voting for their preferred candidate in the primary vote and eliminates tactical voting altogether in the second vote as there are only two contenders.

Appendix B — A.V. Dicey’s Comments on Proportional Representation

In his work Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), the British Whig jurist and constitutional theorist, A.V. Dicey, wrote: ‘I do not contend that proportional representation cannot be defended by weighty considerations; my contention is that it is open to some grave objections which have not received an adequate answer.’

Dicey begins his study by listing three propositions made by those in favour of PR:

1. The Commons often fails to mirror the precise state of opinion of the electorate
2. PR would reflect that state of opinion of the electorate more than the current system
3. It is desirable that every bona fide opinion existing among the electors should be represented in the Commons in as nearly the same proportion

The following are Dicey’s words, which I include here for the convenience of the reader to better understand his objections to PR (bold highlights are my own):

‘Now of these three propositions the substantial truth of the first and second must, in my judgment, be admitted. No one can doubt the possibility, and even the high probability, that, for example, the cause of woman suffrage may, at the present moment, obtain more than half the votes of the House of Commons while it would not obtain as many as half the votes of the electorate. Nor again is it at all inconceivable that at some other period the cause of woman suffrage should, while receiving the support of half the electorate, fail to obtain the votes of half the House of Commons. No one, in the second place, can, I think, with reason dispute that, among the numerous plans for proportional representation thrust upon the attention of the public, some one, and probably several, would tend to make the House of Commons a more complete mirror of what is called the mind of the nation than the House is at present; and this concession, it may with advantage be noted, does not involve the belief that under any system of popular government whatever, a representative body can be created which at every moment will absolutely and with complete accuracy reflect the opinions held by various classes of the people of England. Now my belief in the substantial truth of the first and the second of our three propositions makes it needless for me, at any rate for the purpose of this Introduction, to consider the reservations with which their absolute accuracy ought to be assumed. For the sake of argument, at any rate, I treat them as true. My essential objection to the system of proportional representation consists in my grave doubt as to the truth of the third of the above three propositions, namely, that it is desirable that any opinion existing among any large body of electors should be represented in the House of Commons as nearly as possible in the same proportion in which it exists among such electors.

Before, however, any attempt is made to state the specific objections which in my judgment lie against the introduction of proportional representation into the parliamentary constitution of England, it is essential to discriminate between two different ideas which are confused together under the one demand for proportional representation. The one of these ideas is the desirability that every opinion entertained by a substantial body of Englishmen should obtain utterance in the House of Commons, or, to use a vulgar but effective piece of political slang, “be voiced by” some member or members of that House. Thus it has been laid down by the leader of the Liberal party that it was infinitely to the advantage of the House of Commons, if it was to be a real reflection and mirror of the national mind, that there should be no strain of opinion honestly entertained by any substantial body of the King’s subjects which should not find there representation and speech.

To this doctrine any person who has been influenced by the teaching of Locke, Bentham, and Mil will find it easy to assent, for it is well known that in any country, and especially in any country where popular government exists, the thoughts, even the bad or the foolish thoughts, of the people should be known to the national legislature. An extreme example will best show my meaning. If among the people of any land the hatred of the Jews or of Judaism should exist, it would certainly be desirable that this odious prejudice should find some exponent or advocate in the Parliament of such country, for the knowledge of popular errors or delusions may well be essential to the carrying out of just government or wise administration. Ignorance is never in truth the source of wisdom or of justice. The other idea or meaning attached by Proportionalists to proportional representation is that every influential opinion should not only find utterance in the House of Commons, but, further, and above all, be represented in the House of Commons by the same proportionate number of votes which it obtains from the voters at an election. Thus the eminent man who advocated the desirability of every opinion obtaining a hearing in the House of Commons, used on another occasion the following words: “It is an essential and integral feature of our policy that we shall go forward with the task of making the House of Commons not only the mouthpiece but the mirror of the national mind.” Now the doctrine of proportional representation thus interpreted is a dogma to which a fair-minded man may well refuse his assent. It is by no means obviously true; it is open to the following (among other) objections that admit of dear statement.

Objections to the Third Proposition

‘First Objection The more complicated any system of popular election is made, the more power is thrown into the hands of election agents or wire-pullers. This of itself increases the power and lowers the character of the party machine; but the greatest political danger with which England is now threatened is the inordinate influence of party mechanism.’

‘Second Objection The House of Commons is no mere debating society. It is an assembly entrusted with great though indirect executive authority; it is, or ought to be, concerned with the appointment and the criticism of the Cabinet. Grant, for the sake of argument, that every influential opinion should in the House of Commons gain a hearing. This result would be obtained if two men, or only one man, were to be found in the House who could ensure a hearing whenever he spoke in favour of some peculiar opinion. The argument for woman suffrage was never stated with more force in Parliament than when John Mill represented Westminster. The reasons in its favour would not, as far as argument went, have commanded more attention if a hundred members had been present who shared Mill’s opinions but were not endowed with his logical power and his lucidity of expression. But where a body of men such as constitute the House of Commons are at all concerned with government, unity of action is of more consequence than variety of opinion. The idea, indeed, of representation may be, and often is, carried much too far. A Cabinet which represented all shades of opinion would be a Ministry which could not act at all. No one really supposes that a Government could in ordinary circumstances be formed in which two opposite parties balanced one another. Nor can it often be desirable that an opinion held by, say, a third of a ministerial party should necessarily be represented by a third of the Cabinet. It may well be doubted whether even on commissions appointed partly, at any rate, for the purpose of inquiry, it is at all desirable that distinctly opposite views should obtain recognition. The Commission which laid down the leading lines of Poor Law Reform in 1834 rendered an immense service to England. Would there have been any real advantage in placing on that Commission men who condemned any change in the existing poor law?’

‘Third Objection Proportional representation, just because it aims at the representation of opinions rather than of persons, tends to promote the existence in the House of Commons of numerous party groups and also fosters the admitted evil of log-rolling[ii]. The working of English parliamentary government has owed half of its success to the existence of two leading and opposed parties, and of two such parties only. Using somewhat antiquated but still intelligible terms, let me call them by the name of Tories and Whigs. These two parties have, if one may speak in very broad terms, tended, the one to uphold the rule of the well-born, the well-to-do, and therefore, on the whole, of the more educated members of the community; the other has promoted the power of numbers, and has therefore aimed at increasing the political authority of the comparatively poor, that is, of the comparatively ignorant. Each tendency has obviously some good and some bad effects. If, for a moment, one may adopt modern expressions while divesting them of any implied blame or praise, one may say that Conservatism and Liberalism each play their part in promoting the welfare of any country where popular government exists. Now, that the existence of two leading parties, and of two such parties only, in England has favoured the development of English constitutionalism is past denial. It is also certain that during the nineteenth century there has been a notable tendency in English public life to produce in the House of Commons separate groups or parties which stood more or less apart from Tories and Whigs, and were all but wholly devoted to the attainment of some one definite change or reform. The Repealers, as led by O’Connell, and still more the Free Traders, as led by Cobden are early examples of such I choose these old expressions which have been in use, at any rate from 1689 till the present day, because they make it easier to keep somewhat apart from the burning controversies of 1914.

Cobden would have supported any Premier, whether a Tory or a Whig, who undertook to repeal the Corn Laws. O’Connell would have supported any Premier who had pledged himself to repeal the Act of Union with Ireland; but O’Connell’s position was peculiar. He took an active interest in English politics, he was a Benthamite Liberal; and during a part of his career acted in alliance with the Whigs. These groups avowedly held the success of the cause for which they fought of greater consequence than the maintenance in office either of Tories or of Whigs. Even in 1845 they had perplexed the working of our constitution; they had gone far to limit the operation of the very valuable rule that a party, which persuades Parliament to adopt the party’s policy, should be prepared to take office and carry that policy into effect. The Free Traders, in fact, give the best, if not the earliest, example of an English group organised to enforce the adoption by the English parliament of an opinion, doctrine, or theory to which that group was devoted. Now an observer of the course of events during the last sixty years will at once note the increasing number of such groups in the House of Commons. To-day we have Ministerialists and Unionists (corresponding roughly with the old Whigs and Tories), we have also Irish Nationalists and the Labour Party. These parties have each separate organisations. But one can easily observe the existence of smaller bodies each devoted to its own movement or cause, such, for example, as the temperance reformers, as the advocates of woman suffrage, or as the members who hold that the question of the day is the disestablishment of the Church. This state of things already invalidates our constitutional customs. Nor is it easy to doubt that any fair system of proportional representation must increase the number of groups existing in Parliament, for the very object of Proportionalists is to ensure that every opinion which exists among an appreciable number of British electors shall have an amount of votes in Parliament proportionate to the number of votes it obtains among the electors. If, for example, a tenth of the electors should be anti-vaccinators, the anti-vaccinators ought, under a perfect scheme of representation, to command sixty-seven votes in the House of Commons. Sixty-seven anti-vaccinators who might accidentally obtain seats in the House of Commons, e.g. as Conservatives or Liberals, would, be it noted, constitute a very different body from sixty-seven members sent to the House of Commons to represent the cause of anti-vaccination. The difference is this: In the first case each anti-vaccinator would often perceive that there were matters of more pressing importance than anti-vaccination; but the sixty-seven men elected under a system of proportional representation to obtain the total repeal of the vaccination laws would, one may almost say must, make that repeal the one dominant object of their parliamentary action. That the multiplication of groups might weaken the whole system of our parliamentary government is a probable conjecture. That proportional representation might tend to extend the vicious system of log-rolling is all but demonstrable. Let me suppose the sixty-seven anti-vaccinators to be already in existence; let me suppose, as would probably be the case, that they are elected because of their firm faith in anti-vaccination, and that, both from their position and from their creed, they feel that to destroy the vaccination laws is the supreme object at which every good man should aim. They will soon find that their sixty-seven votes, though of high importance, are not enough to save the country. The course which these patriots must follow is obvious. They are comparatively indifferent about Home Rule, about Disestablishment, about the objects of the Labour Party. Let them promise their support to each of the groups advocating each of these objects in return for the help in repealing legislation which originates, say our anti-vaccinators, in the delusions of Jenner. A political miracle will have been performed. A majority in favour of anti-vaccination will have been obtained; the voice of fanatics will have defeated the common sense of the nation. Let me, as an illustration of my contention, recall to public attention a forgotten fact. Some forty years ago the Claimant, now barely remembered as Arthur Orton, was a popular hero. His condemnation to imprisonment for fourteen or fifteen years excited much indignation. He obtained one representative, and one representative only, of his grievances in the House of Commons. Under a properly organised system of proportional representation, combined with our present household suffrage, he might well have obtained twenty. Does any one doubt that these twenty votes would have weighed with the Whips of any party in power? Is it at all certain that the Claimant might not, thus supported, have obtained a mitigation of his punishment, if not a re-trial of his case? This is an extreme illustration of popular folly.’

Notes

[i] House of Commons Library data for the General Election 2024, published 18th July 2024. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10009/

[ii] log-rolling (or logrolling) is a term used to refer to the trading of favours, in this case to the trading of votes in the Commons.

Additional Resources

1. The Great Canadian Bagel channel, Youtube. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of different voting systems, how they might best be weighted, and an exploration of the voting system types, including comparisons. Recommend starting with the video entitled ‘Electoral Systems: First Past the Post’.
https://youtu.be/UstJQGaWIkY?si=BIVuLxGgKTkG7usM

2. Proportional Representation Is a Terrible Idea That The Left Should Not Embrace by Benjamin Studebaker, 16th June 2022, Current Affairs. The article argues the point from a left-wing position but it could equally be argued from a right-wing position too. https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/2022/06/proportional-representation-is-a-terrible-idea-that-the-left-should-not-embrace

3. Resource reports on Ranked-Choice Voting at Save Our States. Analysis of the grave problems with RCV. https://saveourstates.com/resources Also Ranked Choice Voting Is Unfair and Potentially Dangerous, Mark Burton, DC Journal, 12th October, 2022: https://dcjournal.com/ranked-choice-voting-is-unfair-and-potentially-dangerous/ Also Debunking the Top Ranked-Choice Voting Myths, Sarah Coffey, The Foundation for Government Accountability, 11th April 2023: https://thefga.org/blog/debunking-the-top-ranked-choice-voting-myths/ see also the FGA’s article Ranked-Choice Voting: A Disaster in Disguise at https://thefga.org/research/ranked-choice-voting-a-disaster-in-disguise/

Darren Andrews is the author of Rights Made Simple: A No-nonsense Definition of Rights in Less than 2000 Words, and has long had an interest in political philosophy and constitutional studies.